Content Injection in Samsung Display Solutions Application for Android [CVE-2018-6019]


Samsung Display Solutions App for Android did not use encryption (SSL) for information transmission, thus allowing an MITM attacker to inject their own content into the app. The vendor fixed this issue and users should install the latest version (3.02 or above). MITRE has assigned CVE-2018-6019 to track this issue.


Samsung makes an Android application that allows users to browse B2B content related to Samsung’s display products. While performing network level testing, we discovered that the content shown in the app was loaded via server calls made by the application without any kind of encryption (SSL). This allowed an MITM attacker to inject their own content into the app.

To observe the issue on v3.01:

  1. Install the application on the device.
  2. Setup an MITM proxy but do not install the SSL certificate on the device (we used PacketCapture).
  3. Start the proxy. At this point all network traffic will be going through the proxy with the SSL traffic being encrypted by a self-signed certificate which is not trusted by the device.
  4. Open the app.
  5. Go back to the proxy and observe captured traffic.

All testing was done on Android 7 and application version 3.01. Network captures were performed using an on-device proxy (PacketCapture) without a trusted SSL certificate.

Screenshots of captured traffic attached:

Screenshot_20171210-193610 Screenshot_20171210-193622 Screenshot_20171210-193627 Screenshot_20171210-193633

Vendor Response

The vendor fixed this issue and users should install the latest version (3.02 or above).


CVE ID: CVE-2018-6019
Google Play Link: Google Play Store

Bounty Information

This issue was originally reported to the Samsung Mobile Security Bounty Program but was deemed to be out of scope. However, after being transferred to the Display Solutions team, this issue qualified for the Samsung TV Bounty Program.


Advisory written by Yakov Shafranovich.


2017-09-09: Reported to Samsung Mobile Security bounty program
2017-09-09: Automated response from the vendor received
2017-10-18: Engineer assigned to the issue
2017-11-19: Deemed out of scope; reply sent
2017-11-25: Vendor requests additional information; reply sent
2017-11-27: Issue rejected, public disclosure requested
2017-12-06: Reply from vendor received, additional information requested; reply sent
2017-12-07: Additional information requested by the vendor
2017-12-09: Reply sent with screenshots
2018-01-08: Vendor accepts the issue as in scope, and plans remediation
2018-01-11: Issue transferred to the Samsung TV bounty program
2018-01-14: Fixed version released
2018-01-22: CVE requested and received from MITRE
2018-02-14: Vendor requests confirmation of the fix, fix confirmed and reply sent
2018-02-25: Draft advisory sent to vendor for review; bounty payment received
2018-03-01: Public disclosure