[NOTE: This bug is part of a series of three related Android bugs with the same root cause: CVE-2018-9489, CVE-2018-9581 and CVE-2018-15835. A presentation covering all three bugs was given at BSides DE in the fall of 2018.]

Summary

System broadcasts by the Android operating system expose WiFi signal strength information (RSSI). Any application on the device can capture this information without additional permissions. Rogue applications can potentially use this information for indoor positioning in order to locate or track users within a small area near the WiFi router. Same issue also applies to the underlying Android API, although an additional permission is required.

All versions of Android are believed to be affected. The vendor (Google) has not yet fixed this issue, The vendor (Google) has fixed this issue in Android 10 / Q, however on Android 9 / P one of the two broadcast types is no longer revealing sensitive data (as part of the fix for CVE-2018-9489). The vendor assigned CVE-2018-9581 to track this issue. Further research is also recommended to see whether this is being exploited in the wild.

Background

Android is an open source operating system developed by Google for mobile phones and tablets. It is estimated that over two billion devices exist worldwide running Android. Applications on Android are usually segregated by the OS from each other and the OS itself. However, interaction between processes and/or the OS is still possible via several mechanisms.

In particular, Android provides the use of “Intents” as one of the ways for inter-process communication. A broadcast using an “Intent” allows an application or the OS to send a message system-wide which can be listened to by other applications. While functionality exists to restrict who is allowed to read such messages, application developers often neglect to implement these restrictions properly or mask sensitive data. This leads to a common vulnerability within Android applications where a malicious application running on the same device can spy on and capture messages being broadcast by other applications.

Another security mechanism present in the Android is permissions. These are safeguards designed to protect the privacy of users. Applications must explicitly request access to certain information or features via a special “uses-permission” tag in the application manifest (“AndroidManifest.xml”). Depending on the type of permission (“normal”, “dangerous”, etc”) the OS may display the permission information to the user during installation, or may prompt again during run-time. Some permissions can only be used by system applications and cannot be used by regular developers.

Screenshots of application permissions in Google Play and at run-time:

Vulnerability Details

The Android OS broadcasts the WiFi strength value (RSSI) system-wide on a regular basis. No special permission is needed to access this information. The RSSI values represent the relative strength of the signal being received by the device (higher = stronger) but are not directly correlated to the actual physical signal strength (dBm). This is exposed via two separate intents (“android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE” prior to Android 9; and “android.net.wifi.RSSI_CHANGED” in all versions of Android).

While applications can also access this information via the WifiManager, this normall requires the “ACCESS_WIFI_STATE” permission in the application manifest. For the WiFi RTT feature that is new to Android 9 and is used for similar geolocation, the “ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” is required. But, when listening for system broadcasts, no such permissions are required allowing applications to capture this information without the knowledge of the user.

There are two separate security issues present:

1. RSSI values are available via broadcasts, bypassing the permission check normally required (“ACCESS_WIFI_STATE”).
2. RSSI values, via broadcasts or WifiManager can be used for indoor position without the special location permission.

Steps to Replicate by Regular Users

For Android device users, you can replicate these issues as follows:

1. Install the “Internal Broadcasts Monitor” application developed by Vilius Kraujutis from Google Play.
2.  Open the application and tap “Start” to monitor broadcasts.
3.  Observe system broadcasts, specifically “android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE” (prior to Android 9) and “android.net.wifi.RSSI_CHANGED” (all versions).

Screenshot example:

Steps to Replicate by Developers via Code

To replicate this in code, create a Broadcast receiver and register it to receive the actions “android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE” (Android version v8.1 and below only) and “android.net.wifi.RSSI_CHANGED”.

Sample code appears below:

public class MainActivity extends Activity {
@Override
public void onCreate(Bundle state) {
    IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter();        
    filter.addAction(android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE);
    filter.addAction(android.net.wifi.RSSI_CHANGED);
    registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
}
    
BroadcastReceiver receiver = new BroadcastReceiver() {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    Log.d(intent.toString());
    ….
}
};

Testing Methodology

Our test used the following devices:

• Pixel 2, running Android 8.1.0, patch level July 2018

• Nexus 6P, running Android 8.1.0, patch level July 2018

• Moto G4, running Android 7.0, patch level April 2018

• Kindle Fire HD (8 gen), running Fire OS 5.6.10, which is forked from Android 5.1.1, updated April 2018

• Router used was ASUS RT-N56U running the latest firmware

(We included the Kindle Fire to show that forks of Android inherit this functionality)

The following steps were performed:

1. Install Broadcast Monitor app.
2. Put the phone into airplane mode.
3. Walk into the room.
4. Turn off airplane mode (to trigger the RSSI broadcasts).
5. Get the RSSI values from the following broadcasts:
   1. android.net.wifi.RSSI_CHANGE – newRssi value
   2. android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE – networkInfo / RSSI
6. Repeat steps 3-4 for each room.

Results of the testing cleared showed that each room had a unique range of RSSI values when using a particular device.

Range of values collected during testing:

Vendor Response and Mitigation

The vendor (Google) classified this issue as Moderate and assigned CVE-2018-9581 to track this issue. No fix is available yet A fix is available on Android 10 / Q, however on Android 9 / P one of the two broadcast types (“android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE”) is no longer revealing sensitive data (as part of the fix for CVE-2018-9489). It is unknown if this issue is being exploited in the wild.

References

Android ID # 111698366
CVE ID: CVE-2018-9581
Google Bug # 111662293
GitHub: Internal Broadcasts Monitor
Presentation given at BSides DE: see here

Credits

We want to thank Vilius Kraujutis for developing the Internal Broadcasts Monitor application and making the source code available in GitHub.

We would like to thank multiple academic researchers who have previously published research locating users via RSSI values, including the following papers:

• “Algorithms for Location Estimation Based on RSSI Sampling.” (2008); Papamanthou C., Preparata F.P., Tamassia R.; In: Fekete S.P. (eds) Algorithmic Aspects of Wireless Sensor Networks. ALGOSENSORS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5389. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
• “Comparison of RSSI techniques in Wireless Indoor Geolocation,” (2012); G. A. Naik, M. P. Khedekar, M. Krishnamoorthy, S. D. Patil and R. N. Deshmukh,; 2012 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, Durgapur, 2012, pp. 1-5.
• “Theoretical facts on RSSI-based geolocation,”; (2012) J. S. Picard and A. J. Weiss; 2012 IEEE 27th Convention of Electrical and Electronics Engineers in Israel, Eilat, 2012, pp. 1-5.
• “Adversarial WiFi Sensing” (2018); Yanzi Zhu, et al; arXiv:1810.10109;

This advisory was written by Yakov Shafranovich.

Timeline

2018-03-28: Initial report submitted to the vendor re: CVE-2018-9489
2018-07-19: Separate report created for this issue as per vendor request; testing results provided
2018-07-20: Vendor response received – issue under investigation
2018-08-09: Provided results of Android 9 testing
2018-08-14: Draft advisory provided for review
2018-08-28: Asking about disclosure
2018-09-14: Vendor response receiving, still pending
2018-09-19: Pinged vendor
2018-09-21: Vendor response receiving, issue under investigation
2018-10-14: Notified vendor about upcoming talk
2018-10-15: Vendor response receiving, issue under investigation
2018-10-25: Asking for CVE assignment
2018-10-30: Asked again about CVE assignment
2018-11-01: Asked MITRE for CVE assigment
2018-11-05: CVE assigned by the vendor, notified MITRE
2018-11-06: Slides provided for review
2018-11-09: Public disclosure during a presentation at BSides DE
2018-11-11: Advisory published
2019-09-01: Fix listed as part of Android 10 fixes

[NOTE: This bug is part of a series of three related Android bugs with the same root cause: CVE-2018-9489, CVE-2018-9581 and CVE-2018-15835. A presentation covering all three bugs was given at BSides DE in the fall of 2018.]

Summary

System broadcasts by the Android operating system expose detailed information about the battery. Prior research has demonstrated that the same charging information – when exposed via browser battery status API – can be used to uniquely identify and track users. As the result, the battery API was removed from most browsers.

On Android however, this information is made available with high precision. Furthermore, no special permission is required by any application to access this information. As the result, this can be used to uniquely identify and track users across multiple apps. This was verified via limited testing to be possible within a short period of time.

Android versions 5.0 and later are affected. The vendor (Google) does not classify this bug as a security issue and has not released any fix plans. CVE-2018-15835 has been assigned by MITRE to track this issue. Further research is also recommended to see whether this is being exploited in the wild.

Background

Android is an open source operating system developed by Google for mobile phones and tablets. It is estimated that over two billion devices exist worldwide running Android. Applications on Android are usually segregated by the OS from each other and the OS itself. However, interaction between processes and/or the OS is still possible via several mechanisms.

In particular, Android provides the use of “Intents” as one of the ways for inter-process communication. A broadcast using an “Intent” allows an application or the OS to send a message system-wide which can be listened to by other applications. While functionality exists to restrict who is allowed to read such messages, application developers often neglect to implement these restrictions properly or mask sensitive data. This leads to a common vulnerability within Android applications where a malicious application running on the same device can spy on and capture messages being broadcast by other applications.

Another security mechanism present in the Android is permissions. These are safeguards designed to protect the privacy of users. Applications must explicitly request access to certain information or features via a special “uses-permission” tag in the application manifest (“AndroidManifest.xml”). Depending on the type of permission (“normal”, “dangerous”, etc”) the OS may display the permission information to the user during installation, or may prompt again during run-time. Some permissions can only be used by system applications and cannot be used by regular developers.

Screenshots of application permissions in Google Play and at run-time:

Vulnerability Details

The Android OS broadcasts information about the battery system-wide on a regular basis including charging level, voltage and temperature. No special permission is needed to access this information. This is exposed via the “android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGED” intent and is only available on Android 5.0 or later. The same information is also available via Android’s BatteryManager without a special permission.

A similar capability existed in browsers via W3C’s Battery Status API. However, extensive research by Łukasz Olejnik et al. showed that this API can be used to fingerprint devices, thus leading to tracking of users. Additional research revealed this being used in the wild by multiple websites, and the API was removed from most web browsers as the result.

In our limited testing we were able to distinguish devices located behind the same NAT device within a short period of time, thus leading to session re-spawning, but we were not yet able to replicate all the prior research regarding the HTML5 battery status API. This testing was based on the uniqueness of the current battery charging counter as being different across defines.

As the result, the same privacy issues that applied in the original Battery Status API should apply for Android applications resulting in applications being able to fingerprint and track users, and re-spawn session across multiple apps on the same device. Further research is needed to see if this is being actively exploited in the wild.

Steps to Replicate by Regular Users

For Android device users, you can replicate these issues as follows:

1. Install the “Internal Broadcasts Monitor” application developed by Vilius Kraujutis from Google Play.
2.  Open the application and tap “Start” to monitor broadcasts.
3.  Observe system broadcasts, specifically “android.net.wifi.STATE_CHANGE” and “android.net.wifi.p2p.THIS_DEVICE_CHANGED”.

Screenshot example:

Steps to Replicate by Developers via Code

To replicate this in code, create a Broadcast receiver and register it to receive the action “android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGE”). Sample code appears below:

public class MainActivity extends Activity {
@Override
public void onCreate(Bundle state) {
    IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter();        
    filter.addAction(
	android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGE);
    registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
}
    
BroadcastReceiver receiver = new BroadcastReceiver() {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    Log.d(intent.toString());
    ….
}
};

Vendor Response and Mitigation

The vendor (Google) classified this issue as “NSBC” = “Not Security Bulletin Class” – meaning ““It was rated as not being a security vulnerability that would meet the severity bar for inclusion in an Android security bulletin.” CVE-2018-15835 was assigned by the vendor for tracking. No fix is yet available.

References

Android ID # 77286983
Android Power information: see here
CVE ID: CVE-2018-15835
Google Bug # 77236216
GitHub: Internal Broadcasts Monitor
Presentation given at BSides DE: see here

Credits

We want to thank Vilius Kraujutis for developing the Internal Broadcasts Monitor application and making the source code available in GitHub.

We would like to thank multiple academic researchers who have previously published research on the HTML5 Battery API including the following papers:

• “The Leaking Battery” (2015); by Łukasz Olejnik, Gunes Acar, Claude Castelluccia, and Claudia Diaz;
• “Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis” (2016); by Steven Englehardt and Arvind Narayanan
• “Battery Status Not Included: Assessing Privacy in Web Standards” (2017); Łukasz Olejnik, Steven Englehardt, Arvind Narayanan;

This advisory was written by Yakov Shafranovich.

Timeline

2018-03-28: Initial report submitted to the vendor
2018-03-29: Initial response from the vendor received – issue being investigated
2018-04-03: Vendor classified this as “NSBC”; follow-up communication
2018-04-04: Follow-up communication with the vendor
2018-05-02: Checking on status, response from vendor – issue still under investigation
2018-06-05: Checking status, no response from the vendor
2018-07-01: Checking status, no response from the vendor
2018-07-10: Response from vendor – issue still under investigation; pinged for a timeline
2018-07-12: Vendor still classifies this as “NSBC”; asking about disclosure
2018-08-09: Additional information sent to the vendor re: Android 9
2018-08-14: Draft advisory provided for review
2018-08-21: Vendor is looking in future improvements but the bug is still “NSBC”; communication regarding CVE assigned
2018-08-23: CVE assigned by MITRE
2018-08-28: Another draft of the advisory provided for review
2018-09-19: Pinged vendor for status
2018-10-14: Notified vendor regarding upcoming talk
2018-11-06: Slides provided for review
2018-11-09: Public disclosure during a presentation at BSides DE
2018-11-11: Advisory published